An Analysis of Re Magistrate Robert Young; Ex parte J C [2026] WASC 115
1. Introduction
In Re Magistrate Robert Young; Ex parte J C [2026] WASC 115, Palmer J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed an application for a review order under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) (the Act). The decision addresses a question of practical importance: whether the reasoning of a magistrate may be judicially reviewed independently of the magistrate’s ultimate decision.
The applicant, who had succeeded in resisting a Family Violence Restraining Order (FVRO) application before Magistrate Young, sought to quash certain findings and reasoning in his Honour’s decision while preserving the favourable outcome — the dismissal of the FVRO application. Palmer J held that s 36(1) of the Act does not permit the review of reasons independently of the decision itself, and that a finding of jurisdictional error would necessarily vitiate the entire decision, including the outcome the applicant wished to preserve.
The decision warrants the attention of practitioners in all areas of Magistrates Court litigation. It clarifies the indivisibility of a decision and its reasoning in the context of judicial review, reinforces the distinction between jurisdictional error and error within jurisdiction, and illustrates of the limits of review proceedings — particularly for self-represented litigants who may be dissatisfied with aspects of a judgment but not its result.
2. Relevant Legal Framework
The statutory review mechanism under s 36
Section 36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) provides a statutory alternative to the prerogative writs. It empowers an aggrieved person to apply to the Supreme Court for a “review order” in respect of an act, order, or direction of a court officer that was made without jurisdiction or power, or on any ground that might have justified certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition (at [8]).
The procedure under Order 56A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) involves a two-stage process. At the first stage, the application is heard ex parte before a judge in chambers. A review order will be made if the material demonstrates reasonable prospects of success. If a review order is made, the matter proceeds to a second hearing at which affected parties may appear and be heard (at [10]–[12]).
Jurisdictional error and inferior courts
The concept of jurisdictional error, as described by Hayne J in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57, involves a decision-maker acting outside the limits of the functions and powers conferred upon them, as distinct from incorrectly deciding a matter within jurisdiction (at [18]).
Palmer J reiterated that it is more difficult to demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of an inferior court than in the case of an administrative decision-maker (at [19]), citing Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 and Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1.
His Honour set out the five established categories of jurisdictional error in respect of inferior courts, drawn from Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 and Re State Administrative Tribunal; Ex parte McCourt [2007] WASCA 125, together with the additional category of denial of procedural fairness (at [20]–[21]).
Reasons and the record
A distinction, drawn from Craig v South Australia at 182–183 and reinforced in Re Magistrate D Temby; Ex parte Stanton [2015] WASC 357, is that the reasons for decision of an inferior court are not part of the “record” unless there is an error of law on the face of the record. An error of law in the reasons is not, without more, a ground that might have justified certiorari (at [22]–[23]).
Discretionary refusal
Even where the grounds for a review order are established, the grant of relief remains discretionary. In Blum v Boothman [2014] WASC 452, Mitchell J refused a review order on discretionary grounds because the order had expired and certiorari would lack utility (at [24]).
3. The Facts of the Case
Background: the FVRO Application
The proceedings arose out of a Family Violence Restraining Order application brought by the applicant’s former partner. The FVRO application had generated extensive prior litigation, including two appeals to the District Court, an application to transfer the FVRO proceedings to the Supreme Court (JC v TH [2025] WASC 91), and earlier judicial review proceedings (Ex parte J C [2025] WASC 99) (at [2]).
On 5 August 2025, Magistrate Young heard the FVRO application and dismissed it. The applicant succeeded (at [3]).
The applicant’s dissatisfaction with the reasoning
Despite prevailing on the ultimate question, the applicant was dissatisfied with the Magistrate’s conduct of the proceedings and certain findings in his reasons. The applicant’s complaints included that the Magistrate had found a threat to kill was made (albeit in jest), had made a finding that family violence occurred despite the Family Court making no such determinative finding, had failed to engage with exculpatory evidence including an audio recording, had made prejudicial remarks describing the applicant as “puerile,” “childish,” and “bloody-minded,” and had misapplied the statutory test under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (at [27]–[33]).
The relief sought
The applicant sought to quash Magistrate Young’s factual findings “without disturbing the dismissal of the final restraining order itself” (at [26]). This position was maintained throughout the proceedings. Draft orders filed on 20 October 2025 expressly sought that “the dismissal of the restraining order application by Magistrate Young remain undisturbed” (at [35]). The applicant characterised his application as seeking review of the “reasoning process” rather than the decision (at [36]).
Multiple submissions
The applicant filed a supplementary originating process on 3 September 2025 identifying twelve grounds of review (at [34]), submissions on 25 November 2025 referring to a large number of cases without properly explaining their relevance (at [40]), and further submissions on 15 January 2026 repeating similar assertions (at [41]).
4. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning
The indivisibility principle
The central holding of the decision is unequivocal. Palmer J held that s 36(1) of the Act “does not provide for the judicial review of reasons for a decision, independently and separately from, a review of the decision itself” (at [44]).
His Honour’s reasoning proceeded on two bases. First, as a matter of statutory construction, ss 36(1)(b) and (c) provide for the review of an “act, order or direction” and do not, in their terms, make provision for a review of the reasons why an officer took that act or made that order (at [45]). Second, as a matter of legal principle, where an inferior court has committed jurisdictional error, the consequence is that the entire decision has no legal force. A successful challenge to the Magistrate’s reasoning on jurisdictional error grounds would therefore necessarily vitiate his Honour’s ultimate decision to dismiss the FVRO application (at [46]).
The applicant’s case authorities
The applicant referred to various cases which he claimed demonstrated that reasons could be reviewed without disturbing the ultimate decision. Palmer J found that the applicant’s submissions “failed to meaningfully engage with what was decided in those cases, or how they established the proposition claimed” and that none of the cases appeared to address the issues raised (at [47]).
No reasonable prospect of success
Palmer J concluded that the application had no reasonable prospect of success (at [42], [49]). The costs application relief sought in the draft orders was found to be beyond the scope of the Judicial Review Application (at [50]).
5. Assessing the Consequences
The logical impossibility of selective review
The decision exposes a logical impossibility at the heart of the applicant’s case. Judicial review for jurisdictional error is a binary instrument: if jurisdictional error is established, the decision is void. There is no mechanism to declare that the decision-maker’s reasoning was vitiated by jurisdictional error while simultaneously preserving the operative decision that the reasoning produced.
This has practical consequences. A successful litigant who is dissatisfied with judicial reasoning but content with the result faces a choice: accept the decision in its entirety (reasoning and all), or challenge the decision and risk losing the favourable outcome. There is no middle path.
Reputational harm and the limits of judicial review
Findings of family violence and a threat to kill, even in the context of an ultimately dismissed FVRO application, remain on the public record and may carry reputational consequences. However, Palmer J’s decision confirms that judicial review under s 36 is not the mechanism by which such concerns are addressed. The statutory regime is directed at the legality of decisions, not the curating of judicial observations.
Costs of unsuccessful applications
The applicant, who was self-represented, filed multiple rounds of submissions, a supplementary originating process, and draft orders over a period of several months. The decision illustrates the investment of court and party resources that can be consumed by applications which, are directed at relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant.
6. Worked Example
Consider a hypothetical scenario. A respondent in proceedings before the Magistrates Court successfully resists a claim for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. The Magistrate dismisses the claim but, in the course of the reasons, makes adverse findings about the respondent’s credibility and commercial conduct — findings that the respondent considers factually wrong and potentially damaging to their business reputation.
The respondent’s perspective
The respondent wishes to have the adverse findings set aside. They consult a lawyer about applying for a review order under s 36 of the Act. The lawyer must advise that a review order directed at the Magistrate’s reasoning, without disturbing the dismissal of the claim, is not available. If jurisdictional error were established in the Magistrate’s fact-finding process, the entire decision — including the dismissal — would be void. The respondent would then face a rehearing at which they might not succeed.
The claimant’s perspective
If the respondent were to bring a review application challenging the reasoning, the original claimant could point to Ex parte J C [2026] WASC 115 and submit that the application discloses no reasonable prospect of success, since the applicant does not seek to disturb the operative decision. The claimant could also raise the discretionary ground that the application lacks utility: the findings, while recorded in the reasons, have no operative legal effect.
The practical lesson
The lawyer’s advice must be that the respondent’s remedy, if any, lies outside the judicial review jurisdiction. If the adverse findings are causing concrete harm (for example, being cited in other proceedings), they may need to be addressed in those other proceedings on their merits. Judicial review is not a mechanism for editing judgments.
7. Practitioner Guidance: A Step-by-Step Framework
Step 1: Identify the decision, not the reasoning. When a client is dissatisfied with a Magistrates Court outcome, the first question is whether the complaint is directed at the decision (the act, order, or direction) or at the reasoning. Section 36(1) only provides for review of the former (at [44]–[45]).
Step 2: Assess whether the client is prepared to risk the outcome. If the complaint is with the reasoning but the decision was favourable, the client must be advised that a successful jurisdictional error challenge would void the entire decision, including the favourable outcome (at [46]). If the client is not prepared to accept that consequence, a review application is not appropriate.
Step 3: Distinguish jurisdictional error from error within jurisdiction. It is more difficult to establish jurisdictional error on the part of an inferior court than an administrative decision-maker (at [19]). Mere errors of law in the reasoning, without more, do not constitute grounds for certiorari (at [22]–[23]). Apply the five established categories of jurisdictional error set out by Palmer J at [20].
Step 4: Check whether errors appear on the face of the record. For an inferior court, the reasons for decision are not part of the “record” unless there is an error of law on the face of the record (at [23], citing Craig v South Australia at 182–183). If the error is confined to the reasons and does not appear on the face of the record, the remedy lies in the appellate process, not judicial review (at [22]).
Step 5: Consider discretionary grounds for refusal. Even where jurisdictional error is established, relief is discretionary (at [24]). If the relief sought would lack utility — for example, because the order has expired, or the applicant does not wish to disturb the decision — the court may refuse a review order.
Step 6: Engage meaningfully with case authorities. Palmer J criticised the applicant’s submissions for referring to cases without properly explaining why they established the propositions claimed or how those propositions advanced the applicant’s case (at [40]–[41], [47]). Submissions that merely assert that cases stand for propositions, without analysis, are unlikely to persuade.
Step 7: Confine the application to the scope of the originating process. Relief sought must fall within the scope of the judicial review application as filed. Palmer J noted that the costs application relief in the draft orders appeared to be beyond the scope of the present application (at [50]).
8. Evidence and Arguments Available to Each Side
For an applicant seeking review of reasoning
An applicant in an analogous position would need to overcome the obstacle identified by Palmer J: that s 36(1) does not provide for review of reasons independently of the decision. Arguments that might be advanced include:
First, that the impugned findings constitute a separate “act” or “direction” within the meaning of s 36(1)(c), distinct from the ultimate disposition. Palmer J did not accept this in the present case, but a differently constituted set of facts — for example, where findings have direct operative legal consequences independent of the disposition — might present a stronger argument.
Second, that the reasoning discloses a denial of procedural fairness (the sixth category of jurisdictional error at [21]) which can be addressed without disturbing the outcome — though this argument faces the same difficulty that jurisdictional error vitiates the entire decision.
Third, that the court’s inherent jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction provides a basis for declaratory relief concerning the reasoning, independent of the statutory mechanism in s 36. This argument was not developed in the present case.
For a respondent opposing such an application
A respondent would rely directly on Palmer J’s reasoning:
First, that the plain language of s 36(1) is directed at acts, orders, and directions, not at reasons or findings (at [45]).
Second, that jurisdictional error necessarily vitiates the entire decision, making selective review logically impossible (at [46]).
Third, that even if some basis for review could be found, discretionary refusal would be appropriate where the applicant does not wish to disturb the operative decision and the relief sought therefore lacks utility.
9. Key Takeaways for Legal Practice
Reasons cannot be reviewed independently of the decision. Section 36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) provides for review of an “act, order or direction,” not for review of the reasoning that led to it. A decision and its reasoning are indivisible for the purposes of judicial review (at [44]–[45]).
Jurisdictional error vitiates the entire decision. If jurisdictional error is established, the decision has no legal force. An applicant cannot selectively challenge findings while preserving the operative outcome (at [46]).
The “reasonable prospect of success” threshold requires more than dissatisfaction. At the first stage of the O 56A process, the applicant must demonstrate a case with reasonable prospects of success (at [12], [42]). Disagreement with findings, however strong, is insufficient if the relief sought is not available.
Inferior court reasons are not part of the “record” unless error appears on its face. An error of law in the reasons of an inferior court is not, without more, a ground for certiorari (at [22]–[23]). Errors confined to the reasons must be addressed through the appellate process.
Submissions must meaningfully engage with authority. Asserting that cases stand for propositions without explaining why, or how those propositions advance the applicant’s case, is unlikely to succeed and may attract judicial criticism (at [40]–[41], [47]).
Relief must fall within the scope of the originating process. Additional heads of relief that are beyond the scope of the application as filed may not be entertained (at [50]).
Discretionary refusal may apply even where grounds are established. The grant of a review order is discretionary. Where the relief sought would lack utility, the court may refuse the order (at [24]).
Self-represented litigants are held to the same jurisdictional limits. The decision illustrates that the court cannot extend its review jurisdiction beyond statutory limits to accommodate the concerns of a litigant who has, in fact, succeeded.
10. Conclusion
Re Magistrate Robert Young; Ex parte J C [2026] WASC 115 provides an authoritative statement that judicial review under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) is directed at decisions, not reasoning. A decision and its reasoning are indivisible: an applicant cannot surgically excise findings from a judgment while leaving the operative order intact.
The decision is a reminder for practitioners advising clients who are dissatisfied with aspects of a judgment. The first question must always be: what is the decision, and does the client wish to challenge it? If the answer to the second question is no, then judicial review is not the appropriate avenue, regardless of how unsatisfactory the reasoning may appear.
For self-represented litigants and practitioners alike, the case underscores the importance of understanding the jurisdictional limits of review proceedings before committing resources to an application. Dissatisfaction with judicial reasoning is not, by itself, a gateway to judicial review. The law draws a clear line between the legality of a decision and the acceptability of its reasoning, and s 36 addresses only the former.