When do Court's Grant Leave to Commence an Action Against a Company Under External Administration?

Richard Graham Perth Lawyer

The insolvency landscape is fraught with complexity, especially when one seeks to initiate a lawsuit against a company in external voluntary administration.

In this blog post, I explain the circumstances under which courts grant leave to commence an action against such a company.

The analysis hinges upon a recent Western Australian Supreme Court decision, "Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147", and several other relevant cases and legislative references.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Section 500(2)

Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) stipulates that after the resolution for voluntary winding up, no civil proceeding can be commenced or continued against the company without the court's leave.

This measure aims to prevent a company in liquidation from being overwhelmed by multiple time-consuming and expensive actions (Re Gordon Grant and Grant Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 314; Vagrand Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fielding (1993) 41 FCR 550).

The Court's Discretion

The discretion to grant or refuse leave under these circumstances is broad, and it is not feasible to outline all relevant considerations exhaustively.

However, the amount, seriousness, and nature of the claim, the degree of complexity of legal and factual issues, and the stage at which the proceedings have reached all play crucial roles (Re Gordon Grant; Viscariello v Bernsteen Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] SASC 266).

Prejudice to Creditors

A critical principle is that the action should not prejudice the creditors or hamper the orderly winding up of the company. It is often said that there must be no such prejudice before the action is allowed to proceed (Re Gordon Grant and Grant Pty Ltd (in liq) (1982) 6 ACLR 727; Re Sydney Formworks Pty Ltd (in liq) [1965] NSWR 646).

Insurance and Asset Considerations

The court is less likely to grant leave if there is no prospect of surplus assets in the company and no question of insurance (Re AJ Benjamin Ltd (in liq) [1969] 2 NSWR 374). However, if an insurer stands behind the company in liquidation and is prepared to pay the amount of any judgment awarded, that factor strongly favours the grant of leave (Lawless v Mackendrick [No 2] [2008] WASC 15).

Demonstrating a Serious Question

A claimant seeking leave only needs to demonstrate a serious question to be tried (Vagrand Pty Ltd v Fielding).

Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147

In "Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147", the court was satisfied that there was a serious question to be tried, considering the nature and seriousness of the plaintiff's claim, the defendant's status as a company under external administration, and the existence of a relevant insurance policy.

Cases mentioned in this blog post:

  • Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147

  • Lawless v Mackendrick [No 2] [2008] WASC 15

  • Viscariello v Bernsteen Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] SASC 266

  • Vagrand Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fielding (1993) 41 FCR 550

  • Re Gordon Grant and Grant Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 314

  • Re Gordon Grant and Grant Pty Ltd (in liq) (1982) 6 ACLR 727

  • Re AJ Benjamin Ltd (in liq) [1969] 2 NSWR 374

  • Re Sydney Formworks Pty Ltd (in liq) [1965] NSWR 646

Dealing with Procedural Irregularities under the Rules of the Supreme Court in Western Australia

Richard Graham Perth Lawyer

Procedural irregularities occur commonly, and the courts are often called upon to remedy or address these issues.

In this blog post, I discuss how the Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia allow the Supreme and District Courts to handle procedural irregularities, with a focus on a recent decision, Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147.

The Rules of the Supreme Court

The Rules of the Supreme Court (WA) provide a framework for the conduct of civil proceedings in the Supreme Court and District Court.

Addressing Procedural Irregularities

In Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147, the court was faced with a procedural irregularity relating to the filing of an originating summons.

The plaintiff sought leave to commence civil proceedings against a company in liquidation under section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). However, the plaintiff had not filed an originating process under Rule 2.2 of the Corporations Rules, as required.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 2.10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court to treat the originating summons as if it were an originating process filed under Rule 2.2 of the Corporations Rules.

This allowed the plaintiff to continue the proceedings without the need to re-file the documents and start afresh.

This demonstrates the court's willingness to use its discretion to address procedural irregularities where it is appropriate and just to do so.

Factors Influencing the Court's Decision

In deciding whether to exercise its discretion, the court may consider several factors.

These include whether the procedural irregularity caused any prejudice or injustice to the other party, whether the irregularity can be easily remedied, and the overall interests of justice.

In Hartland -v- Firm Construction Pty Ltd (IN LIQ) [2023] WASC 147, the court determined that there was no prejudice to the defendant in treating the originating summons as if it were an originating process and that doing so would further the interests of justice.

Addressing Conflicts of Interest in Guardianship and Administration Appointments: IC [2023] WASAT 33

Guardianship and administration matters often involve complex legal issues and require careful consideration of the best interests of the represented person.

One such issue that frequently arises is the potential for conflicts of interest when deciding whether someone should be appointed as an administrator.

In this blog post, I discuss conflicts of interest in guardianship and administration cases and explore how the law addresses this issue when a proposed appointee is otherwise suitable for the role.

Conflicts of Interest in Guardianship and Administration

Conflicts of interest can arise when a proposed administrator has personal or financial interests that may not align with the best interests of the represented person.

This can become a significant concern in cases where the administrator is responsible for making important decisions about the represented person's estate, including potential legal claims or the management of assets.

An example of such a conflict can be found in IC [2023] WASAT 33, a recent Western Australia State Administrative Tribunal (WASAT) case, where the proposed administrator was the sister of the represented person and also a beneficiary of their mother's estate.

The Tribunal had to consider whether the sister's dual roles as administrator and beneficiary would create a conflict of interest that could compromise her ability to act in her brother's best interests.

The sister (VC) was the primary beneficiary of their mother's estate, which included the family home.

This created a conflict of interest because her brother (IC), for whom she was proposed to act as an administrator due to his mental disability, was apparently left out of their mother's will.

In other words, he was not set to inherit anything from the mother's estate.

VC stated that she intended to ensure that IC could continue to live in the family home for the rest of his life, which was also their mother's wish.

However, this intention was not legally secured as part of the mother's will.

The inherent conflict of interest lay in the fact that VC, as the beneficiary of the estate, could not act against her own interests and bring a claim on IC's behalf against the mother's estate, as it would potentially reduce the value of the estate she was set to receive.

While VC had the best intentions of providing for IC and ensuring his well-being, the law, unfortunately, has seen many instances where promises made cannot be kept in the future, regardless of the initial good intentions.

This highlighted a clear need for legal intervention to ensure IC's rights and interests were properly protected.

The conflict of interest was particularly significant because it could potentially affect IC's right to housing, given that the family home was part of the mother's estate.

It underscored the importance of considering potential conflicts of interest when appointing an administrator, particularly when the proposed administrator stands to benefit from the estate of the person they are set to represent.

Dealing with Conflicts of Interest

The Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) provides guidelines for determining the suitability of a proposed administrator, taking into account factors such as the compatibility of the proposed appointee with the represented person and the wishes of the represented person (s 68(3) GA Act).

In cases where a conflict of interest is identified, the Tribunal has several options to address the issue.

One option is to appoint a different individual or organization, such as the Public Trustee, to act as the administrator. This can help ensure that the represented person's best interests are protected by an independent party.

In IC [2023] WASAT 33, the Tribunal took this approach, appointing the Public Trustee as a limited administrator with specific responsibilities related to potential legal claims against the mother's estate. The sister was appointed as plenary administrator, save for this limited function given to the Public Trustee. This approach mitigates the conflict, by separating the roles and responsibilities that could potentially clash.

Lessons Learned

Cases like the one underscore the complexity of guardianship and administration matters, and the importance of identifying and properly addressing potential conflicts of interest.

They also highlight the need for legal professionals to be vigilant in spotting these issues and advising their clients accordingly.

The legal framework, including the GA Act and the Family Provision Act 1972 (WA), provide mechanisms to safeguard the best interests of the represented person, but they require careful navigation.

In cases where potential conflicts of interest arise, it's essential to consider all possible solutions - be it appointing a different administrator, creating a limited administration, or separating roles and responsibilities between multiple parties.

Key Take-Aways

  • While conflicts of interest in guardianship and administration matters can be complex, they are not insurmountable.

  • With careful planning, legal guidance, and the flexibility provided by our legal system, it is possible to ensure that the best interests of represented persons are protected, even in situations where conflicts of interest exist.

  • It's a reminder of the importance of specialist legal advice in navigating these challenging situations.

Song v PCL Lawyers Pty Ltd (Legal Practice) [2023] VCAT 505: The Importance of Accurate Legal Costs Estimates

Perth Lawyer Richard Graham

As a costs lawyer, I often come across situations where disputes arise between clients and their legal practitioners over the accuracy of legal costs estimates.

A recent decision from Victoria, Australia, Song v PCL Lawyers Pty Ltd (Legal Practice) [2023] VCAT 505, highlights the importance of providing accurate legal costs estimates and the potential consequences of failing to do so.

In this blog post, I discuss the key takeaways from this decision and the importance of accurate legal costs estimates in maintaining a healthy client-lawyer relationship.

Accurate Legal Costs Estimates

In this case of Song v PCL Lawyers Pty Ltd (Legal Practice) [2023] VCAT 505, Mr. Song argued that he was provided with an inaccurate cost estimate for a brief to be prepared for an expert witness.

This, he claimed, constituted misleading and deceptive conduct under section 18 of the ACL. However, the Tribunal found that the cost estimate provided to Mr. Song was not misleading or deceptive. It was found to be a genuine and honest assessment of the costs likely to be incurred at the time it was given.

Significantly, the Tribunal determined that the initial “quote” given by the law firm was not a fixed quote but an estimate that was based on assumptions, and these assumptions were made clear to Mr. Song. The Tribunal highlighted the importance of clear communication between the legal practitioner and the client when giving cost estimates, noting that the legal practitioner had taken reasonable steps to explain that the quote was an estimate and could be subject to change.

However, the Tribunal Member stated:

“I accept that Mr Song was misled by the estimate provided and that had Mr Song been informed of the actual cost prior to engaging PCL to prepare the brief, he may not have asked them to do so. Further, he has not obtained any benefit from that brief as he ultimately engaged a different expert and briefed that expert himself.”

Despite not finding the legal practitioner or the firm guilty of misleading or deceptive conduct, the Tribunal did order the law firm to refund Mr. Song the sum of $1,000.

This was based on the Tribunal's findings that the law firm had received the sum for the preparation of the brief, but that the brief had not been used, because Mr. Song had engaged a different expert and briefed that expert himself.

Furthermore, Mr. Song claimed for 'time waste and mental damage' due to delays in obtaining an expert report. However, the Tribunal did not find any loss or damage suffered as a result of this delay, as Mr. Song had ultimately filed his own expert report.

Potential Consequences

The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) and the Legal Profession Uniform Law (LPUL) set out the standards and obligations for legal practitioners when providing legal costs estimates.

Failure to comply with these obligations may lead to disputes and potential consequences, including:

  1. Refunds: In some cases, if a client has paid for a service based on misleading cost estimates, they may be entitled to a refund for the amount paid.

  2. Misleading and Deceptive Conduct: Under section 18 of the ACL, legal practitioners are prohibited from engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct. Breaching this provision may lead to legal action and potential penalties.

  3. Disciplinary Action: If a client believes that their legal practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, they may lodge a complaint with the relevant Legal Services Commissioner. Disciplinary proceedings may follow, leading to potential consequences for the legal practitioner.

Tips for Providing Accurate Legal Costs Estimates

To avoid disputes and potential consequences, legal practitioners should consider the following tips when providing legal costs estimates to their clients:

  1. Be thorough and realistic: Provide a detailed and realistic estimate based on a comprehensive understanding of the client's matter and the potential work involved.

  2. Communicate clearly: Ensure that the client understands the basis of the estimate and any factors that may impact the final costs, such as the complexity of the case or the possibility of additional work.

  3. Update the estimate as needed: Regularly review the costs estimate and update it as necessary to reflect any changes in circumstances or new information that comes to light.

  4. Keep the client informed: Maintain open communication with the client about their legal costs throughout the matter, addressing any concerns or questions they may have.

Key Take-Aways

  • Providing accurate legal costs estimates is an essential aspect of the client-lawyer relationship.

  • The case of Song v PCL Lawyers Pty Ltd (Legal Practice) [2023] VCAT 505 serves as a reminder of the importance of fulfilling this obligation and the potential consequences of failing to do so.

  • By being thorough, realistic, and transparent in their estimates, legal practitioners can help ensure that clients are well-informed and maintain a positive working relationship throughout the course of their legal matter.

The Lifespan of Settlement Offers: A Closer Look

Richard Graham Perth Lawyer

In the context of legal proceedings, the offer of compromise is an indispensable tool. It not only hastens the resolution of disputes but also mitigates the potential financial and emotional toll of litigation on all parties involved.

One critical aspect of these offers, however, often stokes debate: the time in which an offer should remain open.

This question has been addressed through several judicial decisions, one of them being Tonkin -v- Heilongjiang Feng Ao Agricultural & Animal Husbandry Group Co Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 378 (S).

This case concerned a Calderbank offer, a specific type of settlement offer, based on the English case Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333.

In the Tonkin case, the court underscored the pivotal role of the Calderbank offer in facilitating dispute resolution. The defendant's offer, a Calderbank offer, was open for seven days until a specified date. However, the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs' rejection of this offer was unreasonable. This evaluation involved a holistic view of the circumstances surrounding the offer.

The court's approach towards Calderbank offers has been shaped by various decisions, both within Western Australia and across the Commonwealth. In the case of Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti [2009] WASCA 115, the court held that the test for awarding indemnity costs against a party who rejected a Calderbank offer was whether the rejection was unreasonable under the circumstances. The burden of proof falls on the offeree to establish unreasonableness.

A similar sentiment was echoed in the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd [No 2] [2011] NSWCA 334. The court posited that a reasonable offer could alter the court's perspective on the costs award, particularly when the party rejecting the offer fails to obtain a better result in the judgment.

When assessing the reasonableness of rejection, several factors come into play. These were elucidated in Lo Presti and further elaborated by Beech J in McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [No 7] [2011] WASC 223 (S). These include:

  • the stage of proceedings at which the offer was received;

  • the time allowed to the offeree to consider the offer;

  • the extent of the compromise offered;

  • the offeree's prospects of success, assessed at the date of the offer;

  • the clarity with which the terms of the offer were made; and

  • whether the offer foreshadowed an application for indemnity costs in the event of the offeree's rejection.

In Tonkin, the court examined these factors to determine the reasonableness of the rejection.

The offer was made within six months of the commencement of proceedings, which was considered marginally in favour of the defendant. However, the court viewed the seven-day timeframe as potentially too short for careful consideration and perhaps expert advice, suggesting 28 days might have been more appropriate.

Key Take-Aways

  • The time in which offers need to remain open is a nuanced issue and depends on various considerations.

  • It requires a careful balance between hastening dispute resolution and allowing enough time for the parties to make informed decisions.

How to deal with opposing lawyers who use “Conferral as a Weapon”

Perth Lawyer Richard Graham

In legal disputes within Western Australia, you often need to confer with the opposing party before initiating a case or making an application in court.

Conferral is intended to encourage cooperation and communication between parties, helping to narrow the disputed issues and facilitate settlement.

However, conferral is not always a smooth and productive process. Occasionally, one party (often the defendant) might use conferral as a weapon to delay proceedings, increase your legal costs, or frustrate your legitimate claims. This behaviour contradicts the underlying objectives of conferral.

As a lawyer specialising in defamation, guardianship, and legal costs disputes, I have seen many instances of conferral being used as a weapon by parties and their legal advisors.

Some common tactics include:

  • Refusing to confer or respond to reasonable requests for conferral;

  • Making unreasonable or excessive demands for information or documents;

  • Raising new or irrelevant issues during conferral;

  • Making false or misleading statements or allegations;

  • Engaging in disrespectful or aggressive behaviour towards the other party or their legal representative;

  • Withdrawing from conferral without notice or explanation;

  • Failing to comply with agreed outcomes or timetables;

  • Deliberately delaying the process to increase the opposing party's legal costs or cause frustration.

To address the issue of conferral misuse and counteract the use of conferral as a weapon, consider these tips:

  1. Be prepared: Before conferring with the other side, make sure you have a clear understanding of your case, your legal rights and obligations, and your desired outcomes. Gather all the relevant information and documents that support your position and be ready to share them with the other side if appropriate. Also, have a realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of your case and the other side's case, and be prepared to negotiate in good faith.

  2. Be proactive: Don't wait for the other side to initiate conferral. Contact them as soon as possible after becoming aware of the dispute and propose a suitable time and method for conferral. This shows that you are serious about resolving the matter and puts pressure on them to respond. If they refuse to confer or ignore your requests, document their lack of cooperation and inform them of the potential consequences, such as sanctions from the court or adverse costs orders.

  3. Be respectful: Even if the other side is using conferral as a weapon, maintain a respectful and professional tone during conferral. Avoid personal attacks, insults, or accusations that may escalate the conflict or damage your reputation. Focus on the facts and the law, not on emotions or personalities. Remember that conferral is not a trial or a debate, but a constructive dialogue aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution.

  4. Be assertive: While being respectful, don't let the other side push you into agreeing to something that is unfair or unreasonable. Stand up for your rights and interests, and don't be afraid to challenge any false or misleading statements or allegations made by the other side. If they make unreasonable or excessive demands for information or documents, ask them to justify their relevance and necessity. If they raise new or irrelevant issues during conferral, remind them of the scope and purpose of conferral and ask them to focus on the main issues in dispute.

  5. Be flexible: Conferral is not a one-way street. You have to be willing to listen to the other side's perspective and consider their proposals. You may have to compromise on some points or make some concessions to reach an agreement. However, this does not mean that you have to give up your core principles or accept an outcome that is detrimental to your interests. You have to balance flexibility with firmness, and know when to accept an offer and when to walk away. Being open to negotiation does not mean allowing the other side to exploit the process or use conferral as a weapon.

  6. Be aware of delay tactics: Recognise when the other side is using delay as a weapon and address it head-on. Keep track of the timeline and document any deliberate delays or stalling tactics used by the opposing party. If the other side consistently prolongs the conferral process without good reason, consider discussing the issue with them, or if necessary, inform the court or seek appropriate remedies.

  7. Set clear boundaries and deadlines: Establish a clear agenda and reasonable timeframes for the conferral process to prevent unnecessary delays or diversions. Make sure both parties are aware of these boundaries and deadlines, and hold the other side accountable if they fail to adhere to them.

  8. Stay focused on the primary issues: Keep the conferral process centred on the main issues in dispute and avoid getting sidetracked by irrelevant matters. If the other side attempts to introduce unrelated or trivial topics, gently steer the conversation back to the primary concerns.

  9. Know your options: If the conferral process is being misused and you have exhausted all efforts to address the issue, be prepared to move on to the next step in the litigation process. Do not allow conferral to drag on indefinitely or become an obstacle to resolving the dispute. Understand the available alternatives, such as mediation, arbitration, or ultimately, litigation, and be ready to pursue these options if necessary.

By being prepared, proactive, respectful, assertive, and flexible, you can more effectively navigate the challenges posed by the misuse of conferral and minimise the impact of conferral being used as a weapon in lawyer-on-lawyer disputes.

Stay focused on your goals, and be willing to adapt your approach when necessary to achieve a fair and satisfactory resolution.

Malvina Park Pty Ltd v Johnson: Understanding Disclosure Obligations Under the Uniform Law

Perth Lawyer Richard Graham

The Uniform Law, effective from 1 July 2022, introduced several changes to the legal profession in Western Australia, particularly regarding costs disclosure.

This article examines the case Malvina Park Pty Ltd v Johnson [2019] NSWSC 1490, which explores disclosure obligations under the Uniform Law.

Due to the possible financial and disciplinary consequences for lawyers and law practices, ensuring compliance with these obligations is crucial.

To better understand the issues in this case, we first need to examine the relevant provisions of the Uniform Law.

The Uniform Law is outlined in Schedule 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic), which, through the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), applies in Western Australia.

Disclosure Obligations

Law practices' disclosure obligations are set out in s174 of Schedule 1.

Section 174(1), titled “main disclosure requirement,” stipulates that a law practice must provide the client with information disclosing the basis on which legal costs will be calculated in the matter and an estimate of the total legal costs as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given.

Additionally, it requires the law practice to disclose any significant changes to previously disclosed information, including changes to legal costs payable.

Section 174(2) deals with “additional information to be provided,” requiring a law practice to inform clients of their rights, such as negotiating a costs agreement, billing method, receiving a bill, requesting an itemized bill, and seeking assistance from the designated local regulatory authority in the event of a legal costs dispute.

This section also covers the information to be provided when there is a significant change in a previous disclosure and legal costs.

Section 174(3), titled “Client’s consent and understanding,” states that if a disclosure is made under subsection (1) or (2), a law practice must take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to both the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs.

Malvina Park Pty Ltd v Johnson: Case Analysis

In Malvina Park Pty Ltd v Johnson[1], the Plaintiff argued that their fixed-price costs agreement should be enforced, while the Defendant contended that the agreement was void due to non-compliance with s174(3).

The Court observed that instead of making arrangements to meet with the Defendant to discuss and explain the Cost Agreement, the Plaintiff chose to send three confusing and complex letters to their client[2].

There was no evidence put forward by the Plaintiff confirming they took any steps to satisfy themselves that the Defendant understood the Cost Agreement and was providing his consent to the proposed course of action and conduct of the matter, other than simply sending it to the client and asking him to sign and return it[3].

The Court found that the Plaintiff sought to rely on Mr. Firth’s evidence in relation to his state of mind and whether he formed a “reasonable opinion” about his client’s understanding of the costs agreement[4]. However, the Court commented that such matters may be relevant for the purpose of s174(3), but the evidence of those subjective beliefs of Mr. Firth as a principal of the law practice needs to be assessed in the light of the actions taken by the law practice at the time of the disclosure under s174 and, in particular, the actual steps taken by the law practice to meet its obligations under s174(3)[5].

The Court accepted that the legislation does not prescribe how a law practice must discharge the duty under s174(3), and that this reflects the

The Court accepted that the legislation does not prescribe how a law practice must discharge the duty under s174(3), and that this reflects the reality that what will be necessary to discharge the duty will vary according to the circumstances of the case and the client[6].

The steps a law practice may need to take will be influenced by the attributes of the client and what the client communicates before and after receiving the disclosure documents[7].

The Court also accepted the Defendant’s submissions that there was no evidence that the Defendant was informed as to the risks occasioned by a fixed-price agreement[8].

The risks went both ways, but the risks for the Defendant were twofold. First, the risk that the legal practice may be incentivized to minimize the work contributed to a particular matter. Secondly, and more significantly, there was a risk that the client will pay more than a matter is objectively worth under such an agreement, even if the discounts under the costs agreement were applied[9].

The Court found that the approach taken by Mr. Firth did not constitute reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the client had understood and given consent to proposed costs when formulated on a fixed-price basis, let alone, the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter[10].

That approach being that he had surmised the client understood and consented from the surrounding circumstances and the client’s communications and that, if asked, he would have dealt with any query in that respect.

Furthermore, no inquiry was made of the client as to his understanding or consent specifically in relation to the fixed-price component of the costs agreement and its implications in the context of the specific litigation under consideration.

Takeaways

  • Compliance with disclosure requirements does not only involve ensuring that you disclose to a client in writing the matters referred to in s174. A law practice is also required to take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to both the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs.

  • The obligation applies to the “law practice.” The steps required to discharge this obligation will depend on the circumstances of the case and client, including the client’s sophistication. It will not be sufficient for a lawyer to rely on their subjective assessment from the surrounding circumstances that the client understood and consented. Active steps are required.

  • If this obligation is not met, the costs agreement may be rendered void under s178(1)[11].

Endnotes

Here are the endnotes for the revised article:

[1] [58].

[2] [59].

[3] [115].

[4] [50].

[5] [59].

[6] [54-57].

[7] [113].

[8] [116].

[9] [116].

[10] [116].

[11] This article does not consider or discuss the application of regulation 72A of the Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015 (NSW) which makes provision for the disapplication of s178(1) and (2) in certain circumstances.

Relying on "Information and Belief" in Affidavits

Perth Lawyer Richard Graham

Affidavits play a crucial role in presenting evidence to the court.

These sworn statements are used in various legal proceedings to establish facts and provide testimony.

One of the key aspects of affidavits is the reliance on information and belief.

Reliance on Information and Belief in Affidavits

In some instances, a deponent may not have direct knowledge of certain facts but can still provide evidence in an affidavit based on information received from other sources or their belief in the truth of such information. This is known as relying on information and belief in affidavits.

This concept is particularly important when dealing with interlocutory proceedings, where there may be limited time and access to direct evidence.

A Western Australian Case: An Illustration

The Western Australian decision of Blythe v the State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 10 offers insights into the practical application of reliance on information and belief in affidavits.

In this case, the affidavit contained hearsay evidence from a former student, but the deponent, Ms. Jorden, failed to identify the student or state that she believed the information provided by the student was true.

The appeal court found that this lack of compliance with the requirements of reliance on information and belief rendered the hearsay evidence inadmissible.

Rule Governing Reliance on Information and Belief in Affidavits

In Western Australia, the reliance on information and belief in affidavits is governed by Order 37 Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA).

According to this rule, an affidavit used for interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief, provided the source of the information is disclosed and the deponent believes the information to be true.

Compliance with the requirements of Order 37 Rule 6 is crucial for several reasons:

  1. Ensuring Admissibility: Properly drafted affidavits that adhere to the requirements of reliance on information and belief increase the likelihood of the evidence being admissible in court.

  2. Countering or Challenging Evidence: Disclosing the source of the information allows the opposing party to counter or challenge the evidence presented in the affidavit.

  3. Potential Prosecution for Perjury: Accurate and complete affidavits are necessary to hold deponents accountable for the veracity of their statements, enabling prosecution for perjury if required.

Lewkowski v Bergalin Pty Ltd

In the case of Lewkowski v Bergalin Pty Ltd (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 7675, 26 May 1989), the court emphasized the importance of following the proper form for statements of information or belief in affidavits. This form is essential not because of a desire for ritualized behavior but because it clearly indicates the source of the information, states the information, and expresses the deponent's belief that what was said is true. If this form is not followed, there is a risk that drafters of affidavits may produce inadmissible evidence under the relevant rules, as seen in In re J L Young Manufacturing Co Ltd [1900] 2 Ch 753.

The court stated, “Preferably statements of information or belief in affidavits should follow the form 'I have been informed by X and verily believe'.”

Following the proper form and complying with procedural rules ensures that evidence presented is admissible, allowing parties to effectively challenge or counter it and preventing potential miscarriages of justice.

In Blythe v the State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 10, the primary court did not rule on the appellant's objection to paragraphs 18 and 19 of Ms. Jorden's affidavit. These paragraphs contained hearsay evidence that should have been deemed inadmissible. The appellant's objection should have been upheld, as the affidavit did not comply with the required form for statements of information or belief under the relevant rules (O 37 r 6). The affidavit failed to disclose the identity of the former student and did not state that Ms. Jorden believed what the student said was true.

As Wheeler JA noted in Westpoint Management Pty Ltd v Goakes [2002] WASCA 317, [14], the requirements of O 37 r 6 are essential because they reveal the original source of the hearsay information, provide an opportunity for an opponent to counter or challenge it, and enable prosecution for perjury if necessary.

The Newspaper Rule in Defamation Cases: Insights from Poland v Hedley [2023] WASCA 69

Perth Defamation Lawyer Richard Graham

Defamation law is a complex area, balancing the protection of individual reputations against the importance of freedom of speech.

A key aspect in defamation cases involving media defendants is the newspaper rule, which offers special protection to confidential sources in the interests of preserving the free flow of information.

In this blog post, I explore the concept of the newspaper rule and its application in defamation cases, drawing on the recent Western Australian case of Poland v Hedley [2023] WASCA 69.

The Newspaper Rule: Definition and Purpose

The newspaper rule is neither a rule of evidence nor a rule of law, but rather a rule of practice in defamation actions (Poland v Hedley, [86]).

It generally prevents courts from compelling media defendants to disclose their confidential sources of information during the pre-trial process (ibid).

This protection against disclosure exists only prior to the hearing of the action, and not at trial (ibid, [87]).

The rule is grounded in the recognition of public interest in the free flow of information (ibid, [88]).

It supports investigative journalism, a vital ingredient of a healthy society, by allowing journalists to protect their sources' confidentiality, thus encouraging information sharing (ibid).

This protection extends to media defendants in analogous interlocutory applications, such as preliminary discovery (ibid, [89]).

The newspaper rule is designed to protect the identity of informants, not the information itself obtained from them (Poland v Hedley, [90]). However, the rule may protect the information if its disclosure would reveal the informant's identity (ibid).

The court exercises discretion in determining whether to require disclosure of a confidential source during the interlocutory stage, taking into account the interests of justice and any special circumstances (ibid, [91]).

Factors Influencing the Court's Discretion

In deciding whether to require disclosure of a confidential source at the interlocutory stage, the court considers several factors depending on the specific case.

These factors may include the manner in which the information was obtained and whether it was obtained lawfully (Poland v Hedley, [93]).

Additionally, the court may be more inclined to order disclosure if the defendants raise the identity and integrity of their confidential sources as part of a qualified privilege defense (ibid, [94]).

Special Circumstances and the Newspaper Rule

The newspaper rule may be overridden by special circumstances or if it is necessary in the interests of justice (Poland v Hedley, [92]). For instance, if the plaintiff may be left without an effective remedy due to the defendant's statutory defense of qualified privilege, the court may compel disclosure to enable the informant to be sued or joined as a defendant (ibid).

Applying the Newspaper Rule in Poland v Hedley [2023] WASCA 69

The Poland v Hedley case provides a valuable example of the newspaper rule's application and the court's discretion in ordering the disclosure of confidential sources. In this case, the court ultimately ordered the production of audio recordings of communications with the confidential source (Source B) for several reasons, including special circumstances (Poland v Hedley, [106]).

The fact that the identity of Source B was already known to the plaintiff, and that the issue revolved around the content of the communications, counted strongly against applying the newspaper rule to refuse protection (ibid, [98], [100]).

A Closer Look at Bingham v Bevan [2023] NSWCA 86 Decision

Perth Costs Lawyer Richard Graham

A recent decision by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Bingham v Bevan [2023] NSWCA 86, offers insights into the repercussions of not adhering to the terms set forth in a costs agreement.

Read my earlier blog post here about a previous NSWSC single judge decision in this dispute, which was about the costs estimates aspect of things

In this blog post, I analyse the NSWCA decision and explain the Court’s rationale with respect to the enforceability of costs certificates.

The Bingham v Bevan Case

The Bingham v Bevan case is centred around a dispute between a solicitor (Bingham) and a barrister (Bevan) regarding the payment of legal fees.

The dispute arose from a costs agreement between the parties that contained a clause (cl 4) specifying that the barrister's fees were contingent upon the solicitor recovering funds from the sale of the client's property or through the client's bankruptcy.

The barrister sought a costs assessment, and the costs assessor found that the costs agreement was void due to non-compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) (the Application Act).

Despite the void costs agreement, the assessor issued a certificate specifying the amount of costs to be paid by the solicitor to the barrister.

The barrister filed the certificate and obtained a judgment in the Common Law Division, which the solicitor appealed.

The main issue in the appeal was whether the barrister was entitled to recover the assessed fees, given the contingent nature of the costs agreement and the fact that the contingency had not been satisfied.

Analysis of the Decision

The Court of Appeal, in its judgment, found that the costs agreement was void due to the solicitor's non-compliance with the disclosure requirements under the Application Act.

However, the Court emphasised that the enforceability of the costs agreement was not solely dependent on compliance with these requirements.

The Court also noted that the recovery of the barrister's fees was contingent on the solicitor obtaining funds from the sale of the client's property or through the client's bankruptcy, as stated in cl 4 of the costs agreement.

Since the contingency had not been met, the Court held that the barrister was not entitled to recover the fees.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment in the Common Law Division, and ordered the barrister to reimburse the solicitor for the amount paid pursuant to a garnishee order.

Key Takeaways:

These 2 NSWSC Bingham v Bevan decisions highlight the following:

  1. Compliance with disclosure requirements: Legal practitioners must ensure they comply with the disclosure requirements set out in the Application Act, as non-compliance can render a costs agreement void.

  2. Enforceability of costs agreements: The terms of a costs agreement, including any contingent fee arrangements, must be clear and enforceable. Failure to satisfy the contingencies can render the fees non-recoverable.

  3. Costs assessment and judgment: Obtaining a costs assessment and judgment based on a void costs agreement can lead to complications and potential reversal of the judgment, as seen in the Bingham v Bevan case.

  4. Importance of clear communication: Legal practitioners should ensure they communicate clearly with their clients and fellow professionals about the terms and conditions of a costs agreement, including any contingent fee arrangements. Proper communication can help avoid disputes and misunderstandings between the parties involved.

  5. Consequences of a void costs agreement: It is essential for legal practitioners to be aware of the potential consequences of a void costs agreement, as it may impact their ability to recover fees. In the Bingham v Bevan case, the barrister was unable to recover the assessed fees due to the void costs agreement and the unsatisfied contingency.